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Abstract
In this article some tenets of classical and contemporary sociology are examined with reference to social prob-
lems that are also topical in civic education. The social problems are: social inequality, inter-communal conflicts, 
and democratic participation. A major obstacle in adopting sociological interpretations of the social problems 
to contemporary civic education lies in sociological reservations toward liberal democracy as a remedy to the 
social problems. More properly, some utopian (from radical to conservative) ramifications of the sociological 
analysis cannot actually be adopted in civic education. As a consequence, sociology is often distanced toward 
normative order and dominant forms of social power and practice of the actually existing societies, including 
liberal democracies. Thus, one can argue that sociology educates “young skeptics”, rather than “young citizens” 
as postulated in some national curricula of civic education. Still, sociology may serve in civic education as an 
abundant source of knowledge for unraveling prejudices and false forms of democracy in the contemporary 
society, and also for questioning some national solutions to pressing social problems. Also, as long as civic 
education has a tendency to idealize the actually existing forms of (liberal) democracy and thus avoiding major 
criticism of the social order, teaching sociology in secondary education in concurrence with CE would be neces-
sary for the sake of establishing a comprehensive education on the contemporary society and citizenship. 
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‘Viewed from within the legal system, the validity of 
norms remains unquestioned, but viewed from “soci-
ety” (by, say, the sociologist), norms are seen as social 
facts and thus open to discussion’ (Luhmann, 2008: 18)
‘/W/hat has come to be understood as “democracy” is 
really just another form of Patriarchy which not only 
excludes most women from enjoying their most basic 
human right to equality, but actually oppresses the 
majority of people.’ (Facio, 2009: 2)
Introduction
‘Why are my students always depressed when they 
leave my sociology class?’ is the subtitle of Brett John-
son’s illuminating article entitled ‘Overcoming “doom 
and gloom”’, consecrated to class-room teaching of 
social problems. He argues that “sociology courses 
often increase knowledge of social issues, while they 
have no effect on, or decrease, students’ levels of per-
ceived civic efficacy” (Johnson, 2005: 47). 
The difficulty with contemporary sociology may 
be owed to the underdevelopment of its capability of 
turning analytical models into predictable and broad-
ly useful recipes for social action, on the one hand. 
Yet, many sociologists want to preserve the cognitive 
integrity of their discipline by keeping up distance to-
ward the social world, primarily its dominant norms 
and values. “Norms are social facts… open to discus-
sion” says Niklas Luhmann in the above citation. In 
fact, a core of contemporary sociology both begins 
and ends its expertise with skepticism. 
The underdevelopment of the applicative knowl-
edge in the part of sociology that has the ambition 
of putting its knowledge into practice of social engi-
neering is stressed by James Coleman in his seminal 
book on social theory (Coleman, 1990). The book, in 
its own right, represents a major effort of bridging 
the gap between theory and practice in sociology, yet 
with prerequisites of the rational choice theory which 
provides rather a reductionist account of social phe-
nomena, which is akin to neoclassical economics. 
Other and basically holistic sociological approach-
es are less geared up for finding proper solutions to 
social problems within a set of means disposable in 
current institutional policies, and are accordingly less 
appropriate for being adopted in civic education (CE). 
According to Scott McNall, the reason why sociology 
is less useful in understanding contemporary social is-
sues and problems is that it is, esp. in teaching, too 
much oriented toward its classics who, as he puts it 
ironically, might have “saved the world in their own 
time”, but not in this, our time. Hence, “our grand the-
ories choke us and our students” (McNall, 2008: 152). 
Again, one must bear in mind that this is a partisan, 
not unison, stance in sociology. As such, it is basically 
inherent to Robert Merton’s tradition in sociology, 
mostly cultivated in the United States, a sociology 
that pleads for the relevance of a local (“middle-range”) 
rather than world-wide perspective on society.
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On the other hand, CE is, to paraphrase McNall’s 
remark, oriented to “this world”-society and is prone, 
more than sociology, to accept its current shape, and 
democracy in the First World within, nearly as the ul-
timate one. According to a widely shared definition, 
“civic education, whenever and however undertaken, 
prepares people of a country, especially the young, 
to carry out their roles as citizens. Civic education is, 
therefore, political education or…the cultivation of 
the virtues, knowledge, and skills necessary for politi-
cal participation” (Crittenden, 2007: 1). Unlike socio-
logical criticism, thus, CE encourages the acceptance 
of the existing institutional order. For example as the 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung highlights, in liberal de-
mocracies CE is an educational stronghold against il-
liberal education: „Civic education was indispensable 
in building a liberal democracy in the Federal Republic 
after 1945 and in reunited Germany after 1989… Ad-
dressing the destruction of the Weimar Republic by 
the combined efforts of extremists from the Right 
and Left as well as analysing the crimes of national so-
cialism and the experience of communist dictatorship 
in the GDR will always remain core elements in civic 
education and its efforts to promote liberal democ-
racy.“ (www.kas.de/.../42.5/). Very often, thus, liberal-
ism is equated with democracy and criticism against 
liberalism, especially if it is inspired by ideologies op-
posing liberalism, such as Marxism or anarchism, used 
to be seen as antidemocratic. 
Yet, from another viewpoint, for example that of 
Karl Polanyi (Polanyi, 1957), a political economist who 
is also taken as the one of the pioneers of historical 
sociology (cf. Skocpol, 1984), the occurrence of to-
talitarian regimes, such as Fascism and Bolshevism, is 
interpreted as a societal reaction to deep economic 
crises caused merely by the expansion of the free mar-
ket economy, as the latter dismantled social bonds of 
economic reciprocation and redistribution which are 
fundamental structures of society. 
In this paper, some tenets of major schools in so-
ciology will be examined, which are concerned with 
social problems topical in the contemporary CE. The 
social problems are: social inequality, inter-communal 
conflicts, and democratic participation (for a list of 
key topics in CE see: Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006; Katunaric´, 2009). Beforehand, cer-
tain reservations of sociological classics toward liber-
al democracy will be discussed. The reservations may 
reveal some grounds of the sociological “apathy” and 
the sociological “salvationism”, respectively. In the 
conclusion, the sociological skepticism as well as uto-
pianism is interpreted as intrinsic to the autonomous 
academic discourse on society, and, at the same time, 
inappropriate to CE as long as the latter is apologetic 
rather than critical toward the actually existing poli-
tics and policies of democracy. 
Classical sociology’s reservations toward 
liberal democracy
In Europe, two main social science paradigms consti-
tuted in the 19th century, i.e. positivism and Marxism, 
were mainly opposed to the ideas and practices of 
liberal democracy, i.e. the political and economic sys-
tem based on individualism, which limits the power 
of the state over the individuals, yet primarily eco-
nomic entrepreneurs. The positivist and the Marxist 
stance against liberal democracy were accompanied 
by similar approaches of other classical authors. For 
instance, Tocqueville assessed the preservation of 
social inequality in post-revolutionary France as well 
as the middle class egalitarianism in America as basi-
cally anti-democratic. Next is Weber’s argument that 
democracy is impertinent to a bunch of institutional 
sectors. It is similar to Simmel’s doubt that democ-
racy can entail the precious balance between competi-
tion and cooperation in the modern society. An excep-
tion among the European classics in this respect, and 
among positivists in particular, is Spencer. Yet, his 
liberalism is more utopian than realistic, for he claims 
for disarmament, which is in contrast to the fact that 
the most advanced liberal states had (and still have) 
the strongest armed forces.1 
Comte’s conservative utopianism. Comte was 
preoccupied with the idea of establishing a world or-
der whose organizational backbone would resemble 
the Roman Catholic Church (cf. Turner, 1990). In con-
trast, when considering the case of France, Comte 
claims that decentralization is a genuine system of 
the political governance, whereas centralization ap-
plies only to the spiritual power (Comte, /1851-1854/ 
1875-1877). In any case, he does not see democracy 
as a major force in constituting national or world so-
ciety. For him, democracy seems to be a permanent 
source of societal instability and disruption, which 
opens the door to revolution. Comte basically aimed 
to synthesize liberalism and conservatism by combin-
ing the idea of progress with the idea of order. How-
ever, he opted for elitism rather than democracy, and 
for sociologically informed technocracy rather than 
broad civic participation in decision-making. Basi-
cally, Comte shares fears of post-revolutionary upper 
class in France against the so called “dangerous class-
es”, i.e. the lower classes whose members increasingly 
protested against the existing political and economic 
regime of the time (cf. Moscovici, 1985). 
1 The next presentation of sociological classics is selective both 
as regards to the authors and as regards to the topic(s). Still, 
the selection of the authors approximates some standard 
line-ups of the classics, as for example the one presented in 
the seminal work of Raymond Aron (Aron, 1998). On the other 
hand, the thematic focus of the paper, i.e. views of different 
sociologists concerning possibilities of liberal democracy for 
to provide cures for the major social problems, has determined 
the briefness of the next paragraphs. 
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Durkheim’s utopian corporatism. Durkheim’s 
idea of organic solidarity for the advanced industrial 
society is similar to Comte’s idea of social order inso-
far as Durkheim’s corporatism – i.e. the consensual tri-
partite governance of industrial workers, government 
and private employers – was also inspired by the 
Catholic social doctrine (Hawkins, 2002; Greve, 1998), 
although the latter propounds corporatism primarily 
in favor of the poorest. On the other hand, Durkheim’s 
idea is also close to secular socialism (Durkheim, 1928). 
His oddness with liberalism is most clearly expressed 
in his theory of the social division of labor, where he re-
iterates his criticism of Spencer’s liberalism and praise 
of competitive economy as congruent to anomic forc-
es in society. Mostly, he rejects Spencer’s assumption 
that society is based on contractual ties of coopera-
tion between individuals. Likewise, Durkheim rejects 
liberal assumption of the existence of an innate hu-
man nature, whether egoistic or altruistic (e.g. by 
Adam Smith). Instead, he maintains that individuals 
and their orientations toward others, including the 
modern quest for happiness, are by no means “natu-
ral”, but are products of social arrangements. (Dur-
kheim, /1893/ 1947). 
Marx’ democracy-from-below utopianism. Marx 
would say that the latter, i.e. the quest for happiness, 
is most certainly the psychological construction of 
the late capitalism, i.e. consumerism, for happiness is 
increasingly conditioned by the power of individual 
to purchase the produced goods… Certainly, Marx is 
the most ardent critic of liberalism among the clas-
sics. His disdain of liberal democracy and its “parlia-
mentary chatterbox” is notorious, as is his reason for 
such position: so long as the parliament confirms the 
class exploitation, it cannot be taken as democratic. 
Thus, the parliament basically misrepresents the 
people’s mind (Marx, 1871). Hence liberal democracy 
being the scenery for an essentially undemocratic re-
gime. A true democracy, according to Marx, will fol-
low the removal of the capitalistic exploitation and 
the establishment of a federation of communes and 
industrial companies (cf. Held, 2006). More radically 
than Durkheim, thus, Marx contended that the market 
rules, and the economic laws derived from them via 
the classical economics, are ideological constructions 
rather than scientific or universal truths. Consequent-
ly, he expected that democracy-from-below should 
replace the representative democracy of bourgeoisie, 
as much as the redistributive economy should replace 
the free market economy. In turn, basic democracy 
and redistributive economy would eliminate major 
social inequalities and conflicts between nations. 
Tocqueville’s utopianism of petite owners. Of-
ten portrayed as an “aristocratic liberal” (Kahan, 1992), 
Tocqueville was genuinely worried about the destiny 
of freedom in a post-revolutionary regime and was 
consequently susceptible to new forms of despotism, 
i.e. a “tyranny of the majority”, under disguise of de-
mocracy (Tocqueville, /1835/ 1990: 254-270). His vi-
sion of the future, yet viable, democracy consists of 
“an innumerable multitude of men…who… possess 
sufficient property to desire the maintenance of order, 
yet not enough to excite envy” (Tocqueville /1840/ 
1990: 252). Accordingly, poverty and wealth should be 
reduced as unacceptable polarities. In a way, this vi-
sion anticipates the idea of the “people’s capitalism” 
of Margaret Thatcher, unlike Social Democracy whose 
middle class is basically property-less and thus, ac-
cording to Tocqueville, may easily succumb to (stat-
ist) despotism. Such a way, by rejecting the real exist-
ing liberal society, i.e. America and post-revolutionary 
France of his time, which consists of both propertied 
and dispossessed classes, Tocqueville shares the pre-
dilections of the classical sociology for the vision of 
a society which transcends the society of their own 
times. 
Weber’s polyarchic society. Weber’s view of 
the democracy that cohabitates with undemocratic 
forms of rule can be comprehended on the basis of 
his three ideal types of authority, i.e. charismatic, tra-
ditional, and rational (Weber, /1914/ 2005). It is not 
that only rational authority, and bureaucracy as its 
central mechanism, have survived the modernity. All 
three types have actually survived modernity and are 
incorporated into its tissue in different portions. To 
be sure, all types may equally be destructive or con-
structive. For example, charismatic power is not only 
a synonym for despotic whims, but also creativity of 
some extraordinary individuals. Similarly, traditional 
authority, such as monarchy or patrimonial rule, is 
pertinent to churches, for instance, but not to parlia-
ments. Eventually, rational or legal authority may be 
beneficial in many areas of society, unless it renders 
the rule of “specialists without spirit” (Fachmensch 
ohne Geist) (Weber /1920/ 1986). It seems that Weber, 
similarly to Simmel (see below), envisages a modern 
society in which democracy and liberalism, as much 
as the rule of law, do not constitute the entire social 
universe, but only a part of it. This part should accord-
ingly be combined or balanced with other parts of 
the society and their procedures of rule, respectively. 
For example, science, economy, arts and medicine are 
sectors mainly ruled by meritocracies, i.e. a mixture 
of charismatic, traditional and rational authority. Fur-
thermore, democratic politics cannot work without 
bureaucracy which, but, as Weber’s student Robert 
Michels contended, leads ultimately to the rule of oli-
garchies (Michels, /1916 2001). 
Simmel’s liberalism in balance with socialism. Al-
though Simmel has been ironic toward egalitarian ideol-
ogies, saying that money, not democracy, is the leveller 
of the world (Simmel, /1903/ 1997), he has appreciated 
the idea of Socialism as a social order that may bring 
more happiness to people than liberalism which is an 
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individualistic idea and can as such hardly be satisfied 
(Simmel, 1900). On the other hand, he argues that the 
principle of individual competition, which is constitu-
tive to liberalism, is indeed indispensable, for competi-
tion may improve the qualities of both products and 
people. In other words, competition and markets are 
instruments for moving guilds, trade-unions, states 
and other collectives to a higher level of both individ-
ual and social existence. Above all, liberalism, accord-
ing to Simmel, takes the competitor as a partner rather 
than an enemy. However, he suspects that the nature 
of the modern economy, i.e. monetarism, where money 
virtually replaces all other values, may truly contribute 
to the individual growth and further civilization devel-
opment. For him, money makes individuals frail and 
societies shapeless. Does it mean that a higher devel-
oped civilization should cancel money as a means of 
payment, what Marx did hope for as well, and would 
instead be ruled by an enlightened technocracy? These 
implications, which are pertinent to Simmel’s thought, 
make it even more alien to the contemporary CE which 
takes monetary economy for granted, as a necessary 
condition for democracy to happen.  
Spencer’s reluctant liberalism. Although Spen-
cer is the only one among the European classics who 
overtly advocates liberalism and competitive society, 
his liberal ideas are sometimes ambiguous. For ex-
ample, he is bewildered by the non-ethical character 
of the liberal order and wonders why liberal nations 
are so militaristic and prone to colonialism, and why 
primitive peoples are still unmatched in the art of 
peace and social harmony (Spencer, 1851). Also, he 
was not always consistent in his writings as regards 
different aspects of liberal democracy. For example, 
commitment to the right of universal suffrage wanes 
in his later writings, especially when women’s rights 
are concerned, because the latter elicit, allegedly, an 
“over-legislation” (Spencer, /1897/ 1978). In general, 
his liberalism is idealistic rather than apologetic. For 
instance, he propounds peace and disarmament de-
spite that it is obvious that most developed liberal 
nations are at the same time the most armed nations. 
Likewise, Spencer is utilitarian and rather inconse-
quential when the diffusion of freedom is concerned, 
when it is needed to protect a large number of people, 
women in the first place, because such protections, 
e.g. quotas for new jobs or employment, contradict 
to the principle of free competition.2
Mead’s liberalism as ideally balanced world soci-
ety. The genuine adherent of the idea of liberal democ-
racy, based on capitalism, among the classics is not a 
European, but an American, George Herbert Mead. He 
argues that the likeliness of Rousseau’s “common will” 
strongly depends on the functional division of labor 
2 Hence, a new form of “democracy” may render a new form of 
Patriarchy, as Facio contends in the above citation. 
by the means of market exchange (Mead, /1934/ 1962: 
287). This conclusion is basically similar to Durkheim, 
although the latter would not subscribe to the mar-
ket optimism. Mead points out, similarly to Durkheim, 
that all human needs as well as human happiness may 
come true only in a “universal society” (Mead, /1934/ 
1962: 281 et passim.). Mead basically shares this posi-
tion with religionists, for the belief in the existence 
in a universal society seems to be taken coterminous 
with its practical existence. Nevertheless, even Mead’s 
enthusiasm for a worldwide liberal society is provi-
sional, for market alone obviously does not work as a 
Great Balancer of human needs and gratifications. Per-
haps, a Pareto optimum for the global economy and 
the establishment of a universal society are religious 
or utopian rather than capitalistic prospects. 
***
The above reminder of the notions of sociological clas-
sics on democracy shows that classics mainly were not 
consigned to ideas and practices of liberal democracy. 
Instead, they were prone either to propound a form 
of liberalism, which is far detached from the actu-
ally existing liberal democracy, or to disclose liberal-
ism, like Marx, as a mask for undemocratic rule. On 
the other hand, classics have proposed other forms of 
rule, such as direct democracy, social corporatism or 
enlightened technocracy. Here, one can concur with 
Boudon when he argues that Durkheim, Weber, Sim-
mel, and Tocqueville were strong supporters of the 
transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, i.e. that 
they were basically committed to the idea of progress, 
and even that they were ‘liberals’, deeply influenced 
by Kant (Boudon, 2004: 122). Nevertheless, their ‘lib-
eralism’ seems to be reluctant, as much as it was that 
of Kant. For him, democracy based on peace requires 
a genuine cosmopolitan legal order, certainly not the 
one with the agenda endorsing the forcible “spread of 
democracy” and secret prisons (cf. Lucht, 2009). The 
classical sociologists actually reject the “perverted ef-
fects” (Boudon’s phrase) of liberalism, such as anomie, 
vulgarity of taste or disdain toward art, all of them 
being caused by profit-seeking and power-seeking as 
the only valuable goals for individuals or society. 
Contemporary sociological answers to the 
social problems
The contemporary sociology did not take a much 
more favorable attitude toward liberal democracy 
than classical sociology. Thus far, sociology does not 
occupy a prominent place among disciplines eligible 
for being included into CE teaching. Still, sociology 
has produced an enormous knowledge, which may 
facilitate the understanding of the causes and conse-
quences of different social problems. Certainly, one of 
the central competences of CE is cognitive as well, i.e. 
to enable students to recognize social prejudices and 
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stereotypes, and to debunk them by the means of em-
pirical evidence (cf. DeCesare, 2005). In this respect, a 
great deal of sociological knowledge might be useful, 
for instance in reducing social distance toward people 
belonging to other cultures (cf. Jedlicka and Katunaric´, 
1985). Yet, different sociological interpretations of 
the causes and consequences of prejudices and stereo-
types, and how to reduce or eliminate them, may not 
only expand, but also curb the possibilities for find-
ing practical solutions to such problems. For example, 
some sociological explanations of social prejudices 
highlight group-maintaining function of prejudices, 
although the explanations do not advocate prejudices 
as such (cf. McLemore, 2004). Nevertheless, research-
ers may be skeptical, for instance, as regards the im-
pacts of the educational efforts in divided societies as 
long as these are replete with tensions and conflicts, 
or where no interethnic civic associations exist (cf. 
Varsheney, 2002; Ajdukovic´, C´orkalo, 2008). 
In general, one part of sociology builds knowledge 
(of society) for its own sake, and the other addresses 
social problems, but most effectively through empiri-
cal analysis (Goldthorpe, 2003), and only rarely by pro-
viding practical guidelines aimed at solving particular 
social problems, which would be, as a competence, ap-
plicable to CE (Mobley, 2007).
In the following, some basic tenets of the major 
contemporary sociological schools – i.e. functional-
ism, class analysis, social constructionism, and rational 
choice – will be exemplified in the way they address 
solutions to the social problems topical to CE as well, 
i.e. social inequality; inter-communal violence, and 
democratic participation. Here, some retention of the 
sociological reservations toward liberal democracy, as 
a remedy for the social problems, can repeatedly be 
recognized. For the sake of making the presentation 
of the topic in such a broad spectrum of sociology as 
clear and coherent as possible, tenets of one represen-
tative author of each school will be presented briefly 
like in the previous paragraphs on the sociological 
classics. The contemporary sociological authors are: 
Niklas Luhmann (representing functionalism/system 
analysis), Immanuel Wallerstein (representing class/
world system analysis), Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann (representing social constructionism), and 
James Coleman (representing rational choice).
Functionalism: democracy as a product of 
the functionally differentiated society?
Luhmann interprets social inequality as a remnant of 
traditional societies, in which division of labor over-
lapped with social ranking (Luhmann, 1997: 1055-
1060). The inequalities can accordingly be reduced or 
even eliminated in the modern society where – similar 
to Durkheim’s vision – different profession and occu-
pations will be treated as equals, and thus lined up 
horizontally. 
By the same token, horizontal or functional differ-
entiation should eliminate ethnic and similar com-
munal conflicts which also, like classes, originate in 
traditional segmental society (Luhmann, 1997, Ch.2). 
This conjecture is also similar to Durkheim, i.e. his evo-
lutionary typology of society and his explanation of 
the sources of anomie or conflict in the older, i.e. seg-
mental, society. 
For Luhmann, furthermore, the political theory 
of (liberal) democracy must be transformed into so-
ciological theory. This is because the evolution of 
the modern political system is concomitant with the 
evolution of law, and the purpose of the politics is to 
implement law. Yet, democratic political parties are 
immoral insofar as they defend their cause or their 
vote as the only “true”, whereas others are rejected as 
“untrue”. Thus, unlike impartiality of the universal law, 
politics is partisan and as such inappropriate for gov-
erning over a functionally differentiated society; oth-
erwise, politics must structurally be “coupled” with 
the legal system (Luhmann, 2000: 390; cf. Thornhill, 
2006). This deduction is akin both to Durkheim’s cor-
poratism and to Simmel’s implications of an enlight-
ened technocracy. 
Class analysis or how to secure the 
transition from liberal to direct democracy
Wallerstein’s world system analysis modifies Marx’ 
class analysis for the sake of its application to the 
global society. In Wallerstein’s interpretation, class 
inequalities are commensurable with inequalities be-
tween rich and poor countries, and the divisions be-
tween core, periphery and semi-periphery correspond 
to the divisions between upper, middle and lower 
classes on national levels (Wallerstein, 1974). Further-
more, the upper class in a country on the periphery, 
according to Wallersteins’s model, must be taken as 
the member of the core capitalistic class. 
He has predicted that capitalism should collapse 
around the middle of 21st century, but he could not an-
ticipate as to whether capitalism will be replaced by 
a more adequate economic and social system (Waller-
stein, 1996)
Wallerstein’s interpretation of inter-communal con-
flicts, particularly nationalism, is subdued to class 
analysis. Simply, he argues that nationalism and rac-
ism are ideologies that defend capitalism in its down-
ward cycles, and that the upper classes are those who 
benefit from the conflicts. Nevertheless, he forfeits 
that all successful revolutions from below had a na-
tional form and that the national would be a center-
stage of the future political struggles for democracy 
(Wallerstein et al., 1990).
As far as democracy is concerned, Wallerstein shares 
the central Marxist assumption that genuine or basic 
democracy is possible only as a follow-up of the estab-
lishment of the socialistic economy. 
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Social constructionism without civic issues 
In their seminal book The Social Construction of Real-
ity, Berger and Luckmann did not mention democracy 
and human rights whatsoever. In the introductory 
part of the book, the authors argue that such topics, 
including the idea of freedom, are not properly socio-
logical:
‘Is man free? What is responsibility? Where are the lim-
its of responsibility? How can one know these things?.... 
/T/he sociologist is in no position to supply answers 
to these questions. What he can and must do, how-
ever, is to ask how it is that the notion of “freedom” 
has come to be taken for granted in one society and 
not in another, how its “reality” is maintained in the 
one society and how… this “reality” may once again 
be lost to an individual or to an entire collectivity.’ 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1975, 14-15). 
This way, social constructionism assumes that free-
doms and rights can sociologically be considered only 
as facts that vary with different societies or cultures. 
Accordingly, there is no absolute or prior meaning of 
rights and freedoms and similar issues. Perhaps, this 
approach might fit chapters in CE which tackle multi-
cultural democracy and citizenship, i.e. where liberal 
assumption of rights and freedoms meet with col-
lectivistic assumptions of democracy (as elaborated, 
for example, by Kymlicka, 1995). However, there was 
no place for the word “culture” in Berger’s and Luck-
mann’s foundational work on social constructionism. 
Nevertheless, social constructionists of the subse-
quent generations have contributed much more to 
the knowledge of different cultures, including how 
cultures were used in generating ethnic or religious 
boundaries and also violent conflicts (cf. Joireman, 
2003). Still, their contribution to the peace research 
and, generally, to the skills of conflict management 
is not exclusively sociological, as it cannot be under-
stood nor performed without broad interdisciplinary 
collaboration, primarily with cultural anthropology 
(cf. Galtung, 2002).
How rational is choice in a suboptimal 
democracy? 
‘In an absolute democracy (where all rights are held 
collectively), the people may be as coercive and arbi-
trary as an individual despot’ (Coleman, 1990: 337). 
This assertion represents Coleman’s response to the 
so called Sen’ paradox. The paradox says that liberal-
ism cannot be acceptable or optimal for all members 
of a society. To be sure, Coleman is right when revok-
ing the despotic nature of collectivism. Nevertheless, 
the vices of the latter do not automatically provide 
virtues for the former. Basically, Coleman underlines 
the profound difference between the two systems of 
allocation of resources, since the latter ‘evaluates poli-
cies according to their consequences for each individ-
ual separately, whereas liberalism… judges policies ac-
cording to the liberty they permit for each individual’ 
(Coleman, 1990: 335). 
Coleman argues that democracy is a majority rule 
principle and cannot be otherwise, because there 
would be no possible democratic choice anymore, in-
cluding emigration of persons to societies where they 
can employ their abilities at the best, which is their in-
alienable property. ‘/I/f a subordinate class eliminates 
property rights following a revolution, they must 
also effectively eliminate emigration rights. This may, 
however, eliminate the incentive for individuals in 
the next generation to acquire the personal resources 
that make them productive, so such a system may be 
foredoomed to a lower level of productivity’ (Cole-
man, 1990: 356). So far so good. But, how to qualify 
developed countries’ restrictive policies of immigra-
tion aimed at protecting the resources of their own 
citizens against immigrant contenders?
Unfortunately, in place of considering the cases of 
serious inter-communal conflicts whether in the US or 
in the world at large under auspices of the rational 
choice model, Coleman illustrates his assumptions on 
a relatively trivial example, namely a conflict over the 
curriculum in Pasadena schools in the US. On its hand, 
this example might have been used to make compari-
son to some other (inter)communal conflicts. Yet, he 
does not do such an analysis, nor does his method of 
producing evidence deal with corresponding social-
historical contexts. Instead, most of his examples are 
fictive and garnished with invented characters or per-
sons, which reminds of experimental science designs 
rather than sociological analysis. 
Nevertheless, perhaps the production of empirical 
evidence is not important at all, because the assump-
tions cannot be conclusively tested as long as the so-
cial problems – such as inequality, participation and 
conflicts in the context of liberalism and democracy 
– are attempted to be explained, or even solved, on 
the level of methodological, or even political, nation-
alism. This means that rejecting the others under the 
pretext of their belonging to “another” world, and not 
“our” world, cannot sociologically be justified. The 
only adequate meaning of contemporary industrial 
society in sociology is global. It is a society in which 
all members are interdependent in their actions, and 
even their feelings and thoughts, and where there are 
no barriers for their interactions, unless created by ar-
tificial boundary-makers, whether empires, states or 
just by criminals. 
Unlike Coleman and many other contemporary so-
ciologists, classics – at least Comte, Marx, and Dur-
kheim, and Simmel in some respect – have postulated 
methodological cosmopolitanism or the world soci-
ety as a proper framework for solving social problems 
such as social inequalities, inter-communal conflicts, 
and democratic participation. Such way, the social 
problems traditionally seen as internal or external to 
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a society, and divided in such respect, now become in-
ternal or “our” common problems. Unfortunately, nei-
ther CE curricula nor textbooks in their present shape 
postulate the world integration of polities, economies 
and cultures as the ultimate solution for the funda-
mental social problems. They rather cherish method-
ological nationalism.3
Conclusions
Limited adequacy of sociological knowledge to CE is 
due to underdevelopment of the applicative dimen-
sion of sociological knowledge as far as the solutions 
of the pressing social problems are concerned. More 
properly, in its positivistic design sociology finds its 
application in empirical analysis rather than social ac-
tion or interventionism. Yet, a more important reason 
for sociological inadequacy to contemporary CE might 
be epistemological. It is that a core of sociology, es-
pecially the classic one, is prone to a variety of uto-
pianisms: conservative, communist, corporatist and 
liberal. In any case, sociologists rarely or never see ac-
tually existing liberal democracy, and capitalism alike, 
as a remedy for the social problems that it produces, 
i.e. social inequality and poverty, inter-communal 
conflicts, and limitations to democratic participation. 
Furthermore, a part of sociology, but again mostly 
the classic one, cherishes a holistic and cosmopolitan 
rather than particularistic and nationalistic notion of 
society, which surpasses the methodological scope on 
society, mostly limited to nation-state, in a typical CE 
curriculum. 
Thus, the central problem in establishing a more 
encouraging relationship between sociology and CE 
is that reformist, let alone radical, ramifications of so-
ciological analysis cannot actually be adopted in CE, 
for they can supposedly be labeled as “subversive” or 
“antidemocratic”. On the other hand, CE is a primarily 
normative, and partly apologetic, form of education 
for liberal democracy. It is normative in the sense that 
it teaches students to behave differently than they 
used to. For example, how to adopt social skills in or-
der to participate in a public dialogue (as declared in 
the national curriculum of CE in Finland, for example) 
or how to tolerate diversities (Netherlands), or how 
to collaborate with others (Norway) (see more details 
in: Katunaric´, 2009). CE is also partly apologetic for it 
educates “young citizens” (as declared, for example, 
in the national curriculum in Scotland), rather than 
“young nonconformists”, for instance, in the sense that 
3 Virtually, in all curricula in the twelve countries under research 
– Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, Scotland, Eng-
land, Austria, Germany, Slovenia, Hungary, and Croatia – it has 
been taken for granted that the social problems are basically 
solvable within actually existing nation-states (cf. Katunaric´, 
2009). Likewise, the curricula do not see problems emerging 
in the Third World countries as something that concerns the 
domestic agenda of the First World countries. 
the former are expected both to respect and to accept 
actually existing institutional policies or practices in 
their countries, while the latter are not. 
In the end, one may contend that sociology edu-
cates “young skeptics”, similarly to “non-believers” 
when attitudes toward religion are concerned. Here, 
religion is substituted for the belief in democracy as 
a real possibility, paradoxically, in a society occupied 
with oligarchic patterns of social power and prestige 
virtually in all its spheres, from schools to companies 
and government. Perhaps, this is the main reason why 
the sociological enlightenment provides cognitive 
rather than moral incentives to the learning of/about 
democracy, and that sociology with its insistence on 
the basic distinction between values and facts, and 
between institutional norms and social practices, re-
spectively, approaches to the normative dimension of 
civic education rather with vigilance.
Still, sociology may represent an abundant source 
of knowledge in CE, especially for unraveling the false 
forms of democracy in the contemporary society, and 
for deconstructing questionable national solutions 
to pressing social problems. Alternatively, as long as 
civic education has a tendency to idealize the actu-
ally existing forms of (liberal) democracy and thus 
avoiding major criticism of the social order, teaching 
sociology in secondary education (which has a rather 
long-lasting tradition – cf. DeCesare, 2005) may pro-
vide a complementary solution. In sum, sociology 
and civics should be concurrent rather than mutually 
exclusive subjects. Accordingly, CE may represent a 
sort of normatively oriented subject, while sociology 
may represent a critical and fact-oriented subject in 
contemporary education on society and citizenship.
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